Statoil ordered to improve at Heimdal
Norwegian offshore safety agency the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has sent a notification of order to Statoil following an audit of Heimdal main platform and riser pipe platform, offshore Norway, seeking improvements of the company’s operations.
The PSA carried put an audit of operations, maintenance and pressure safety focused on Statoil’s and Gassco’s land organizations and the Heimdal Main Platform (HMP) and Heimdal Riser Platform (HRP). The audit was conducted between 22 and 29 September 2016.
The objective of the audit was to monitor the management of operations, maintenance, safety-critical equipment and pressure-safety systems in particular on HRP and HMP, in relation to the company’s own and the authorities’ requirements. The allocation of responsibilities and tasks between Gassco as the operator and Statoil as the technical service provider catering for the functioning of the facility was key to the audit.
According to the safety authority, the audit identified seven non-conformities in relation to the petroleum regulations. The non-conformities concern the management of activities on HMP and HRP, barrier management, fire protection within the plant, the independence of the process safety systems, governing documents, Gassco’s supervisory responsibilities and alarm management in the control room at Bygnes.
The agency also detected three areas with potential for improvement. These areas are alarm management in the control room at Heimdal, Statoil’s own follow-up, and deficiencies in the system for equipment labeling, and defective labeling in the plant.
The agency has given an order to Statoil to demonstrate through production of short- and long-term plans for operation and maintenance that sufficient personnel will manage operational and maintenance tasks on the platforms and that the maintenance program and its execution are adapted to the age and condition of the facilities and equipment.
Furthermore, Statoil needs to ensure that barriers which have been weakened or are non-functional are identified, evaluate the combination of weakened barriers, and ensure that requisite compensatory measures are implemented and that a plan is in place to improve barriers that are non-functional or weak.
Finally, the Norwegian company needs to demonstrate that the gas-transport system connected to the Vesterled pipeline satisfies the regulatory requirements for two independent process-safety systems.