NTSB Blames Captain for El Faro Sinking
The El Faro tragedy, which was the deadliest shipping disaster involving a US-flagged vessel in more than 30 years, was caused by the captain’s failure to avoid sailing into a hurricane.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that the sinking occurred due to the captain’s decisions, despite numerous opportunities to route a course away from hazardous weather.
“We may never understand why the captain failed to heed his crew’s concerns about sailing into the path of a hurricane, or why he refused to chart a safer course away from such dangerous weather,” Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chairman, said, “but we know all too well the devastating consequences of those decisions.”
The 790-foot El Faro sank on October 1, 2015 in the Atlantic Ocean during Hurricane Joaquin, taking the lives of all 33 seafarers who were aboard.
The ship departed Florida on September 29 and had a range of navigation options “that would have allowed it to steer clear of the storm that later became a Category 4 hurricane.”
NTSB said that the captain, consulting outdated weather forecasts and ignoring the suggestions of his bridge officers to take the ship farther south and away from the storm, ordered a course that intersected with the path of a hurricane that hit the ship with 35-foot seas and 100 mph winds.
As the ship sailed into the outer bands of the storm, about five hours prior to the sinking, its speed decreased and it began to list to starboard due to severe wind and seas. In the last few hours of the voyage, the crew struggled to deal with a cascading series of events, any one of which could have endangered the ship on its own, according to the investigation results.
Seawater entered the ship through cargo loading and other openings on a partially enclosed deck in the ship’s hull, pooled on the starboard side and poured through an open hatch into a cargo hold. The hold began to fill with seawater, and automobiles in the hold broke free of lashings and likely ruptured a fire main pipe that could have allowed thousands of gallons of seawater per minute into the ship – faster than could be removed by bilge pumps.
About 90 minutes before the sinking the listing ship lost its propulsion and was unable to maneuver. Although the captain ordered the crew to abandon ship when the sinking was imminent, the crew’s chances of survival were significantly reduced because El Faro was equipped with life rafts and open uncovered lifeboats, which met requirements but were ineffective in hurricane conditions.
The NTSB also said that the poor oversight and inadequate safety management system of the ship’s operator, TOTE, contributed to the sinking.
“Although El Faro and its crew should never have found themselves in such treacherous weather, that ship was not destined to sink,” said Sumwalt.
“If the crew had more information about the status of the hatches, how to best manage the flooding situation, and the ship’s vulnerabilities when in a sustained list, the accident might have been prevented.”
As a result of the 26-month long investigation, the NTSB made 29 recommendations to the US Coast Guard, two to the Federal Communications Commission, one to the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, nine to the International Association of Classification Societies, one to the American Bureau of Shipping, one to Furuno Electric Company and ten to TOTE Services.