USA: GAO Finds Deficiencies in USCG and DOI Offshore Inspection Programs

Last week, GAO testified before the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation regarding offshore energy inspection programs. The written statement, Deepwater Horizon: Coast Guard and Interior Could Improve Their Offshore Energy Inspection Programs (GAO-12-203T), can be accessed by clicking here, and the hearing webcast can be accessed at transportation.house.gov

In addition to GAO, witnesses included Coast Guard Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft and Retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral Roger Rufe.

This hearing focused on three government investigations conducted in the wake of last year’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. It specifically looked at the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) Report, the Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), and the Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) Report. GAO’s statement combined its work at the Coast Guard the Department of the Interior. Collectively, these two agencies conduct oversight inspections of offshore facilities to ensure compliance with regulations related to security, safety, and production.

Although the Coast Guard has taken steps to enhance the security of offshore facilities, it has only conducted from 13% to 45% of the required security inspections in recent years. Reasons given for these lapses included confusion over who should be responsible, what type of facility that should be inspected, and difficulty tracking which inspections were needed. Similarly, the Department of Interior has not conducted all of its required inspections.

It achieved its internal safety inspections targets, but these targets were set at only 10% of facilities each year. Interior missed its internal targets for regulatory inspections to measure oil and gas production in three out of four years. Production inspections are vital for calculating government revenue and also for determining which facilities fall under Coast Guard security regulations.

Reasons given for these lapses included problems with hiring, training, and retaining inspectors. In addition, these issues might be further exacerbated by Interior’s own reorganization. The testimony also discussed security jurisdictions for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs). Coast Guard’s authority to perform security inspections on these facilities, especially foreign-flagged self-propelled MODUs like the Deepwater Horizon, is more limited than on other types of offshore energy facilities.

In summary, GAO found deficiencies within both the Coast Guard and Department of Interior programs for inspecting offshore facilities. Recommendations have been made to both agencies, and some implementation has begun to occur.

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Source: GAO , November 9, 2011